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INTRODUCTION
The probate exception to federal jurisdiction prohibits federal
courts from hearing cases involving matters related to the probate of
wills or administration of estates.1 It is a doctrine that has been
described as “one of the most mysterious and esoteric branches of the
law of federal jurisdiction.”2 There are two primary policy
justifications underlying this exception: first, since probate
proceedings are in rem the federal courts cannot interfere with the state
court’s control over estate property; second, the state courts are
presumed to have proficiency in dealing with probate matters.3 But
while the probate exception has traditionally been applied in the
context of diversity jurisdiction cases, its applicability to federal
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Emory University, 1995.
1
Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946).
2
Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982).
3
Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Peter Nicolas,
Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1482-1483 (2001) (discussing various policy
justifications for the probate exception).
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question cases is less certain.4 Given that the purpose of federal
question jurisdiction is to give federal courts the power to interpret
federal law,5 should the probate exception apply to limit that
authority? The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Marshall v. Marshall6 took a significant step towards clarifying the
scope of the probate exception as applied to federal question cases,
holding that it does not necessarily bar a federal court from hearing a
probate-related matter in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.7
However, though Marshall narrowed the applicability of the probate
exception in the specific context of claims arising out of a federal
bankruptcy case,8 it still left open the issue whether it applies to other
federal question cases.9
Not long after the Supreme Court’s decision in Marshall, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was faced with
this very issue in Jones v. Brennan, a case which involved a claim

4

Compare Jones, 465 F.3d at 306 (holding the probate exception applicable in
federal question cases), with Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.
1988) (holding that the exception only applies to diversity cases). There are also
several secondary sources on the subject which refer to the exception specifically as
the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Christian J. Grostic, A
Prudential Exercise: Abstention and the Probate Exception to Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 104 MICH. L. REV. 131 (2005); Shawn R. McCarver, Note, The
“Probate Exception” to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Matters Related to Probate,
48 MO. L. REV. 564 (1983); 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 936 (2006) (section
is titled “Probate exception to diversity jurisdiction”); 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 7
(2006) (“Under the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction, a federal court may
not probate a will, administer an estate, or entertain an action that would interfere
with pending probate proceedings in a state court”).
5
See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 15 (4th ed. 2005).
6
126 S.Ct. 1735 (2006).
7
Id. at 1746.
8
Id. at 1746, 1748; see also Brian Hermann & Penny Dearborn, Supreme
Court 2006: The Supremes Expand Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 25-AUG AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 48, 85 (July/Aug. 2006) (discussing how the Supreme Court
expanded bankruptcy jurisdiction in Marshall and another recent case).
9
See Jones, 465 F.3d at 306.
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of probate proceedings.10 In its
analysis, the court cited Marshall as serving to clarify the scope of the
exception.11 But rather than following the Supreme Court’s lead in
interpreting the exception narrowly, the Seventh Circuit took a broader
view and held it applicable to federal question cases.12 This Comment
analyzes the effect that the Marshall decision has on cases involving
the probate exception, specifically in the Seventh Circuit, and how that
precedent should be used as a basis for formulating a clearer and
narrower approach to the exception’s application to federal question
cases. Part I provides background information on the history of the
probate exception, and how it relates to federal jurisdiction. Part II
discusses cases that applied the probate exception prior to Marshall.
Part III examines the background facts and procedural history of
Marshall. Part IV analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s application of
Marshall in Jones v. Brennan, and suggests that it should have
followed the narrowing trend evident in Supreme Court precedent and
further restricted the parameters of the probate exception.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. The Origins of the Probate Exception
Though the probate exception is a doctrine that is well-established
in the federal courts,13 its origins are not entirely clear. 14 It is often
10

Id. at 305.
Id. at 306
12
Id. at 306-07.
13
Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.3d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Gregory C.
Luke & Daniel J. Hoffheimer, Federal Probate Jurisdiction: Examining the
Exception to the Rule, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 579 (1992) (“The probate exception is
alive and well in all circuits; it survives with Supreme Court support.”).
14
Jones, 465 F.3d at 306-07; Dragan, 679 F.3d at 713; see generally John F.
Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 PROB. L.J. 77 (1997)
(tracing the evolution of the probate exception beginning with the eighteenth century
English court system).
11
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analogized to the domestic relations exception, which prohibits federal
courts from hearing claims involving matters related to divorce,
alimony, and child custody decrees.15 The most common explanation
grounds the probate exception in the statutory grants of jurisdiction
under the Judiciary Acts of 1789 and 1875, which provided that
federal courts would have jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity.”16 This language is generally interpreted
with reference to the structure of the eighteenth-century English
judicial system and the types of claims that could be brought in the
various courts.17 American courts have read the phrase “at common
law or in equity” as granting jurisdiction to those claims that could, in
1789, have been brought in the English courts of common law and the
High Court of Chancery (equity).18 Probate matters typically did not
fall into the categories of law or equity, and were handled instead by
the ecclesiastical courts.19 Therefore, issues involving probate were
considered to be outside the scope of federal court jurisdiction.20
15

For more information on the domestic relations exception, see, for example,
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992); Michael Ashley Stein, The
Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled
Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669 (1995); 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal
Courts § 948 (2006).
16
The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. Federal question jurisdiction was
granted by the Judiciary Act of 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470,
470.
17
For examples of decisions citing to the historical division of claims among
the various types of English courts as the source of origin for the probate exception,
see Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 1746 (2006); Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S.
490, 494 (1946); Jones v. Brennan, 465 F. 3d 304, 306-307 (7th Cir. 2006); Golden
v. Golden, 382 F.3d 348, 357 (3d Cir. 2004); Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 (2d
Cir. 2002); Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1988); Goerg v. Parungao,
844 F.2d 1562, 1565 n.8 (11th Cir. 1988).
18
See, e.g., Markham, 326 U.S. at 494; Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1500.
19
See, e.g., Golden, 382 F.3d at 357; Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1500. For a
thorough and detailed discussion of the historical jurisdiction of the English courts,
see Winkler, supra note 14, at 78-88. In addition to probate of wills, the
ecclesiastical courts also had exclusive jurisdiction over matrimonial issues, hence
the relationship between the probate and domestic relations exceptions. See James E.
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The accuracy of this historical interpretation of the probate
exception’s origins has recently been questioned. For example, in the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Dragan v. Miller, Judge Richard Posner
pointed out two problems with the theory:
First, there is no ecclesiastical court in America, and it
is not obvious why the language of the Judiciary Act of
1789 should be taken to refer exclusively to English
rather than American courts. . . . Second, the scope of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court is
very uncertain. In particular, it appears not to have
extended beyond personal property; apparently the
court of chancery had extensive jurisdiction over the
inheritance of land.21
Judge Posner’s skeptical view of this justification for the probate
exception is shared by other courts and legal scholars as well. The
Supreme Court described the exception as arising from “misty
understandings of English legal history,”22 and recognized that the
federal equity courts have jurisdiction over some probate-related
claims, including “suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and
other claimants against a decedent’s estate.”23 Additionally, a detailed
account of the various interests involving probate matters and the
relief available to enforce those interests in both English and Colonial
Pfander, The Playmate and the Probate Exception: The Probate Exception Lay
Dormant for Decades, but Anna Nicole Smith’s Supreme Court Case Brought It
Back to Life, 94 ILL. B.J. 320, 320 (2006).
20
See, e.g., Markham, 326 U.S. at 494; Winkler, supra note 14, at 1500-01.
21
Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1981) (internal citations
omitted).
22
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1741. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
echoed this characterization, describing the statement in Markham that the English
chancery courts lacked jurisdiction over probate matters as a “bald assertion” and a
theory “only sporadically and tentatively cited as justification for the exception.” Id.
at 1751.
23
Markham, 326 U.S. at 494 (internal citations omitted).
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American courts reveals that the distinction among law, equity, and
ecclesiastical claims may not be as clear-cut as courts have assumed.24
Because of the confusion surrounding its historical origins, at least one
scholar has characterized the probate exception as a “myth of federal
law” which should be abandoned.25 This uncertainty, however, has not
stopped federal courts from regularly applying the doctrine.26
B.

The Relationship Between the Probate Exception
and Federal Jurisdiction

Modern federal court jurisdiction is defined by Article III of the
United States Constitution,27 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.28 There
is nothing in the language of these provisions that explicitly bars
federal courts from hearing probate claims; rather the probate
exception is an implied restriction on federal jurisdiction that has been
developed through the common law.29 This raises an interesting
question: why allow a common law doctrine to limit an exercise of
24

Winkler, supra note 14, at 78-101; see also Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1518-

19.
25

Winkler, supra note 14, at 78, 152.
Luke & Hoffheimer, supra note 13.
27
Section 1, cl. 2 reads in pertinent part: “The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the
United States.”
28
The grant of federal question jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18
Stat. at 470, was later codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1331: “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” Diversity jurisdiction originally granted by the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. at 78, is codified in 28 U.S.C. 1332(a):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $ 75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between (1)
Citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in
which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties;
and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
29
Nicolas, supra note 14, at 1520.
26
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federal jurisdiction that would otherwise meet the constitutional and
statutory criteria?
One way that courts have attempted to justify the restriction on
federal jurisdiction is by characterizing the exception as statutory in
origin.30 But since this historical foundation has been called into
question,31 the exception has also been justified based on policy
considerations. Among the policies claimed to be served by the
probate exception are the promotion of legal certainty and judicial
economy, respect for the expertise of the state courts in dealing with
probate matters, and the interest in avoiding unnecessary interference
with state probate system.32 This concern with the function of the state
courts has led some scholars to advocate for an application of the
probate exception based on the doctrine of prudential abstention.33
Under the various theories of abstention, federal courts have discretion
to decline to exercise jurisdiction to protect an “important
countervailing interest” of a state.34 Therefore, it has been suggested
that even if a probate-related claim appears to fall outside the
parameters of the probate exception, courts should nonetheless
undertake an abstention analysis to determine if it should hear the
case.35

30

See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
32
Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Nicolas, supra
note 3, at 1483.
33
See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1528-40, 1546; Grostic, supra note 4, at
144.
34
32A AM. JUR. 2D FEDERAL COURTS § 1229 (2006). For additional
information on the types of abstention, see, for example, 17A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & VIKRAM DAVID AMAR,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241; Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1528-41.
35
Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1546; Grostic, supra note 4, at 144-149.
31
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II. THE APPLICATION OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION
PRIOR TO MARSHALL
A. Markham v. Allen
Markham v. Allen is an early decision in which the Supreme Court
attempted to limit the applicability of the probate exception.36 In its
opinion in Marshall, the Court described Markham as its “most recent
and pathmarking pronouncement on the probate exception.”37 At issue
in the case was whether there was federal jurisdiction over “a suit
brought by the Alien Property Custodian against an executor and
resident heirs to determine the Custodian’s asserted right to share in
decedent’s estate which is in course of probate administration in a state
court.” 38 In her will, California resident Alvina Wagner left property
to several German citizens.39 Her heirs-at-law, six California residents,
filed a petition in state court for a determination of heirship, claiming
that they were entitled to Wagner’s estate because under California law
“the German legatees were ineligible as beneficiaries.”40 As
Custodian, Markham issued an order vesting in himself the interests of
the German legatees.41 He then brought suit in federal court for a
declaratory judgment that his was the sole interest in Wagner’s estate,
and that the California heirs-at-law had no such interest.42

36

326 U.S. 490, 494-95 (1946); see also Hermann & Dearborn, supra note 8,

at 85.
37

Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 1746 (2006).
Markham, 326 U.S. at 491-492. The petitioner’s role as an Alien Property
Custodian was pursuant to § 5(b)(1)(B) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, § 301,
55 Stat. 839 (as amended by the War Powers Act 1941). For more information on
this statute and the authority granted to Alien Property Custodians, see Bethany Kohl
Hipp, Comment, Defending Expanded Presidential Authority to Regulate Foreign
Assets and Transactions, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1311, 1316-1335 (2003).
39
Markham, 326 U.S. at 492.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
38
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Though the district court entered judgment in Markham’s favor,43
the Ninth Circuit reversed citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction due
to the applicability of the probate exception.44 It reasoned that since
the state probate court was “‘in possession of the property, its right to
proceed to determine heirship cannot be interfered with by the federal
court.’”45 The Supreme Court, however, held that the probate
exception did not extend to the situation at hand.46 It articulated the
following test for determining when the probate exception bars federal
jurisdiction:
[W]hile a federal court may not exercise its jurisdiction
to disturb or affect the possession of property in the
custody of a state court…it may exercise its jurisdiction
to adjudicate rights in such property where the final
judgment does not undertake to interfere with the state
court’s possession save to the extent that the state court
is bound by the judgment to recognize the right
adjudicated by the federal court.47
In applying this test, the Court concluded that the declaration of
Markham’s sole interest in the estate did not qualify as an interference
with the state’s possession of the property because “the effect of the
judgment was to leave undisturbed the orderly administration of the
decedent’s estate in the state probate court.”48 Since the power to
administer the estate remained with the state court, the federal court
was not attempting to exercise probate jurisdiction and therefore was
not barred from hearing the claim.49 The Court, however, did not stop
its analysis upon concluding that federal jurisdiction was proper, and
43

Id. at 493.
Id.
45
Id. (quoting Allen v. Markham, 147 F.2d 136, 137 (9th Cir. 1945)).
46
Markham, 326 U.S. at 495.
47
Id. at 494 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
48
Id. at 495.
49
Id.
44
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went on to consider whether or not the district court should have used
its discretion to decline to hear the suit because it involved issues of
state law.50 It reasoned that such an exercise of discretion was
unnecessary in this situation for two reasons: first because “[t]he mere
fact that the district court . . . is required to interpret state law is not in
itself a sufficient reason for withholding relief to petitioner”51; and
second, because the district court was exercising power granted to it
by a federal statute.52
B. From Markham to Marshall: Confusion in the Federal Courts
Regarding the Scope of the Probate Exception
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Markham, the “[l]ower
federal courts have puzzled over the meaning of the words ‘interfere
with the probate proceedings.’”53 This confusion is manifested in two
ways: first, there are several different tests used by the courts to
determine the parameters of the exception;54 second there is
disagreement regarding its applicability to federal question cases.55
1. Overview of the Tests Applied in Probate Exception Analysis
In response to the Supreme Court’s definition of the exception
articulated in Markham, three primary tests have been developed by
the lower courts to determine whether there is interference with state

50

Id.
Id.
52
Id. at 495-96. Section 17 of the Trading with the Enemy Act “specially
confers on the district court, independently of the statutes governing generally
jurisdiction of federal courts, jurisdiction to enter ‘all such orders and decrees . . . as
may be necessary and proper in the premises to enforce the provisions’ of the Act.”
Id. (quoting the Trading with the Enemy Act, § 301, 55 Stat. 839).
53
Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 1748 (quoting Markham, 326 U.S. at
494).
54
See Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1488; Grostic, supra note 4, at 133.
55
Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 2006).
51
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probate proceedings.56 The first is the nature of the claim test, which
“examines the nature of the plaintiff’s claim, with the plaintiff’s
position vis-à-vis the will being the dispositive factor. Under the
‘nature of the claim’ test, if the plaintiff’s claim rests upon an assertion
that the will is invalid . . . then the case falls within the probate
exception.”57 An example of the application of this test can be seen in
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Moser v.
Pollin.58 That case involved a dispute regarding a will that had been
admitted to probate which left the decedent’s estate entirely to his
sister to the exclusion of his only child.59 The court concluded that
since the plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with inheritance
was “in substance nothing more than a thinly veiled will contest,” it
qualified as a “pure probate” matter over which the federal court was
unable to exercise jurisdiction.60
Another example of a test applied by courts is the route test. This
test:
[E]xamines the route that the suit would take had it
been brought in state court. . . . [I]f the dispute under
state law could be adjudicated only in a probate court,
then there is no federal court jurisdiction. If, however,
under state law the state courts of general jurisdiction
would have jurisdiction over the dispute, then federal
court jurisdiction exists.61
This test was applied by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in Lepard v. NBD Bank, where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in
the administration of a trust was held to be barred by the probate
56

The various tests are laid out in detail in Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1488-92
and Grostic, supra note 4, at 133-135.
57
Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1488.
58
294 F.3d 335, 340-341 (2d Cir. 2002).
59
Id. at 335.
60
Id. at 340-341.
61
Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1489.
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exception because the state probate courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over all probate matters.62 Though the application of the route test
involves a fairly straight-forward interpretation of state law, it leads to
inconsistent results since “the scope of the probate exception varies . .
. according to the internal division of jurisdiction within each state
between its probate courts and its courts of general jurisdiction.”
The third and final test is referred to as the practical test. This
approach was developed by Judge Posner and is applied in the Seventh
Circuit.63 Under this approach, the probate exception applies when the
exercise of federal jurisdiction would “impair the policies served by
the probate exception.”64 In Dragan v. Miller, the court concluded that
there was no jurisdiction over a tortious interference with inheritance
claim based on weighing such factors as an interest in judicial
economy, relative expertise of the state and federal court, and the
promotion of legal certainty.65 Judge Posner focused on the fact that as
a practical matter this claim was essentially a will contest, and because
the procedure for will contests was governed exclusively by the
Illinois Probate Code, the factors of judicial economy and relative
expertise weighed heavily against an exercise of federal jurisdiction.66
2. The Circuit Split Regarding the Applicability of the
Probate Exception to Federal Question Cases
The probate exception has typically been applied in cases based
on diversity of jurisdiction.67 This is due to the fact that with probate
62

384 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2004)
The test was first articulated in Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 715 (7th Cir.
1981). Another example of its application is Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th
Cir. 2003).
64
Dragan, 679 F.2d at 715. For more information on policy considerations see
supra note 32 and accompanying text.
65
Dragan, 679 F.2d at 715-16.
66
Id. at 716.
67
Jones v. Brennan, 465 U.S. 304, 306 (7th Cir. 2006). As further evidence of
this proposition, note that all of the cases discussed in Part II.B.1, supra, were based
on diversity of jurisdiction.
63
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cases, “the cause of action is usually either a breach of contract claim
or a garden-variety state common law claim—such as fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence, or wrongful death.”68 Its application to
federal question cases, however, is not quite as certain.69 One court—
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit—explicitly stated the
inapplicability of the probate exception to federal question cases in
Goerg v. Parungao.70 The court pointed to Congress’ power to create
bankruptcy jurisdiction and the preemption of state law in this area
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution to reach the
conclusion that the probate exception “relates only to 28 U.S.C. §
1332 and has no bearing on federal question jurisdiction, the
jurisdiction invoked in bankruptcy cases.”71 The Ninth Circuit,
however, came to a contrary conclusion, “specifically reject[ing] the
Goerg pronouncement and [holding] that the probate exception is
applicable in bankruptcy cases.”72 It found the policy rationale of
avoiding federal interference with state probate proceedings to be “as
relevant to federal question cases as it is to diversity cases.”73
III. MARSHALL V. MARSHALL: THE SUPREME COURT REVISITS THE
ISSUE OF THE SCOPE OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION
When the Supreme Court decided Marshall in 2006, it was the
first time it addressed the probate exception since Markham sixty
years earlier.74 In an interesting twist, this “arcane” doctrine became
the subject of renewed attention because of the quasi-celebrity
marriage of a Playboy model to a billionaire over three times her age,
68

Nicolas, supra note 3, at 1494-95.
Jones, 465 U.S. at 306.
70
844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1988).
71
Id.
72
In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) rev’d on other grounds
sub nom Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735 (2006).
73
Id.
74
126 S.Ct. 1735 (2006). The Markham decision, 326 U.S. 490 (1946), is
discussed in more detail supra Part II.A.
69

74
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and the resulting dispute over his estate following his death.75 It was a
battle that started in a Texas probate court, later moving to a California
bankruptcy court and federal district court, to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and eventually being heard by the United States Supreme
Court.76
A. Facts and Procedural History of Marshall
The petitioner in Marshall, Vickie Lynn Marshall, is better-known
as Playboy model Anna Nicole Smith.77 In 1994, she married Texas
billionaire J. Howard Marshall (“J. Howard”); he was 89 years old, she
was 26.78 Just over a year after their marriage, J. Howard died, leaving
a will that provided nothing for Vickie and named his son, Pierce, as
the ultimate beneficiary.79 During the course of the proceedings in a
Texas probate court regarding J. Howard’s will, Vickie filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in a California court.80 Pierce then filed a proof
of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, claiming that Vickie had
defamed him and the debt arising from her alleged defamation was not
dischargeable.81
75

Pfander, supra note 19, at 320.
The procedural history of the Marshall case is somewhat complicated, and
involves two separate, but related claims heard by the Bankruptcy and District
Courts of the Central District of California. The citations for these various decisions
are provided as they are addressed in the following paragraphs.
77
For more information than one could possibly want on Vickie Lynn
Marshall, a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith, see, for example, http://www.annanicole.com
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Nicole_Smith. As evidence of her popularity
(notoriety?), a Google™ search for her name turned up 2.5 million results (as of
December 2, 2006). For the remainder of this article, I will refer to her as “Vickie,”
as that is the name under which the various claims at issue were brought.
78
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1741; Pfander, supra note 19, at 320.
79
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1741-42.
80
Id. at 1742. The citation for the initial bankruptcy claim is In re Marshall,
253 B.R. 550 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000).
81
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1742. Pierce’s defamation claim was based on the
allegation that Vickie’s lawyers told the media that he “had engaged in forgery,
fraud, and overreaching to gain control of his father’s assets.” Id. (citing one of the
76
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Vickie responded to Pierce’s defamation allegations asserting the
defense of truth.82 She then counterclaimed against Pierce for tortious
interference with an expected inheritance.83 Among the allegations
made by Vickie in support of her counterclaim were that Pierce
“effectively imprison[ed] J. Howard against his wishes; surround[ed]
him with hired guards for the purpose of preventing contact between
him and Vickie . . . and transfer[ed] property against J. Howard’s
expressed wishes.”84 The bankruptcy court found in Vickie’s favor and
awarded damages in the amount of nearly $450 million (less whatever
she received out of the Texas probate proceedings), plus punitive
damages.85 In addition, in a second, related bankruptcy court
proceeding, the court held that it had the authority to enter judgment
on the tortious interference counterclaim because it qualified as a
“core proceeding” to a case brought under title 11.86
two opinions entered by the District Court of the Central District of California, In re
Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 9 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002). Pierce claimed that the debt arising
from the alleged defamation would not be dischargeable because it involved
“‘willful and malicious injury by the debtor.’” Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)).
82
Id.
83
Id. For additional information on tortious interference with inheritance, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979) (“One who by fraud, duress or
other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third
person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to
liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.”).
84
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1742.
85
In re Marshall, 253 B.R. at 553, 561.
86
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1742-1743; In re Marshall, 257 B.R. 35, 39-40
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000). Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), “[b]ankruptcy judges may
hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under
title 11, or arising in a case under title 11…and may enter appropriate orders and
judgments[.]” A core proceeding is defined as including “counterclaims by the estate
against persons filing claims against the estate[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), which
the Bankruptcy Court believed was sufficient to bring Vickie’s counterclaim against
Pierce under its authority to enter a final judgment, In re Marshall, 257 B.R. at 3940. If a claim is not considered to be a core proceeding, then a bankruptcy judge may
still hear the case, but instead of entering a final judgment, proposed findings and
conclusions are submitted to the district court for de novo review. 28 U.S.C. §
157(c)(1).
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Pierce contested the judgment of the bankruptcy court on the
grounds that the tortious interference claim could only be heard by the
Texas probate court, and that the probate exception barred the
bankruptcy court from considering it or entering a final judgment.87
The bankruptcy court rejected Pierce’s probate exception argument as
not being timely raised and therefore waived as grounds for a
challenge of subject matter jurisdiction.88 It also engaged in a brief
analysis of whether the exception is even applicable to federal
question cases, concluding that it should be narrowly construed to
permit federal courts to hear claims other than those involving
“probating of a will, administering a decedent’s estate, or assuming
control of property in the custody of the state court.”89
Upon review, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California upheld the bankruptcy court’s determination that
the probate exception was not a bar to federal jurisdiction over
Vickie’s tortious interference claim, but it applied a different
analysis.90 The district court disagreed with the determination that
Pierce had waived his probate exception argument,91 but ultimately
concluded that such an argument was not applicable to the issue at
hand because there was no interference with the Texas probate
proceeding.92 In addition to this holding, the district court also
expressed as dictum its belief that the probate exception “likely applies
to all matters in federal court, not just those premised on diversity
jurisdiction.”93
After an intermediate bankruptcy proceeding in the Central
District of California in which the original findings were modified and
adopted,94 the case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.95 The Ninth
87

Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1742.
In re Marshall, 257 B.R. at 38.
89
Id. at 37-38.
90
In re Marshall, 264 B.R. 609, 619-625 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
91
Id. at 619
92
Id. at 621.
93
Id. at 620.
94
In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
88
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Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court, holding that even
though Vickie’s claim “does not involve the administration of an
estate, the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter,”96 the
federal courts were nonetheless barred from hearing claim by the
probate exception.97 The court reached this conclusion based on its
broad interpretation of the exception as reaching “not only direct
challenges to a will or trust, but also questions which would ordinarily
be decided by a probate court in determining the validity of the
decedent’s estate planning instrument. Such questions include fraud,
undue influence upon a testator, and tortious interference with the
testator’s intent.”98 Vickie’s claims, in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit,
were a “disguised attack” on the disposition of J. Howard’s property
under a trust instrument and therefore within the scope of the probate
exception.99
B.

The Supreme Court’s Narrow View of the Probate Exception

After the Ninth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court judgments
entered in Vickie’s favor,100 she appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.101 The Court granted certiorari “to resolve the apparent
confusion among federal courts concerning the scope of the probate
exception.”102 The Court ultimately agreed with the district court that
the probate exception was not applicable to Vickie’s claims,103 and
criticized the Ninth Circuit for the “sweeping extension” of its
application.104
95

In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004)
Id. at 1133.
97
Id. at 1137.
98
Id. at 1133.
99
Id. at 1137.
100
Id.
101
Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735 (2006).
102
Id. at 1744.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1741.
96

78

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

The Supreme Court supported its narrow interpretation of the
probate exception based on a similar approach taken in Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 105 a case involving the domestic relations exception to
federal jurisdiction.106 In Ankenbrandt, the plaintiff brought suit
against her ex-husband and his companion seeking damages for sexual
abuse of the plaintiff’s children.107 The Court reversed the finding of
the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that the
plaintiff’s tort claim fell within the domestic relations exception and
could therefore not be heard by the federal courts.108 The domestic
relations exception, the Court noted, should only apply to divest
federal courts of jurisdiction over such narrow issues as “divorce,
alimony, and child custody decrees.”109 It reasoned that while state
courts are proficient in dealing with such matters, “federal courts are
as equally equipped to deal with complaints alleging the commission
of torts.”110 Therefore, if the domestic relations exception is to be
construed narrowly, then given their similar origins, the probate
exception should be as well.111
The Marshall Court’s attempt to limit the applicability of the
probate exception builds on its earlier articulation of the exception’s
scope in Markham.112 It recognized the confusion caused by the
language “‘interfere with the probate proceedings,’”113 and offered the
following clarification of the phrase:

105

504 U.S. 689 (1992).
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1744-45. See supra note 15 and accompanying text
for further information regarding the domestic relations exception.
107
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1744-45 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 691).
108
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1745 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 692, 706707).
109
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703.
110
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1746 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704).
111
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1746.
112
Id. at 1747-48; see the discussion of Markham, 326 U.S. 490 (1946), supra
Part II.A.
113
Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1747-48 (quoting Markham, 326 U.S. at 494)
106
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[W]e comprehend the ‘interference’ language in
Markham as essentially a reiteration of the general
principle that, when one court is exercising in rem
jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume
in rem jurisdiction over the same res. Thus, the probate
exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or
annulment of a will and the administration of a
decedent’s estate; it also precludes federal courts from
endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the
custody of a state probate court. But it does not bar
federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those
confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.114
The Court then analyzed Vickie’s claims under this standard.115
First, her claims did not involve a matter of pure probate, such as
probating a will or administering an estate, but rather alleged the
“widely recognized tort” of tortious interference with inheritance.116
Second, she sought in personam jurisdiction over her stepson, Pierce,
and did not seek to gain control over property in the custody of the
state court.117 Furthermore, the Court found no policy justification for
applying the probate exception to this situation because “[t]rial courts,
both federal and state, often address conduct of the kind Vickie
alleges. State probate courts possess no ‘special proficiency…in
handling [such] issues.’”118 Based on this analysis, the Court held that
federal jurisdiction over Vickie’s claims was not barred by the probate
exception.119

114

Marshall, 126 S.Ct. at 1748 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 1748-49 (quoting Ankenbrant v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992)).
119
Id. at 1746.
115
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBATE
EXCEPTION AFTER MARSHALL
A. Jones v. Brennan
In Jones v. Brennan, the Seventh Circuit had its first opportunity
to apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Marshall.120 Lois Jones
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County probate
judges, the county’s public guardian and two of his deputies, and four
private lawyers appointed by the court as guardians ad litem, and
requested compensatory and punitive damages.121 She claimed that the
defendants “conspired to deprive her of property without due process
of law in the course of probate proceedings involving her father’s
estate.”122 In her complaint, Jones made a number of allegations,
including that the probate judges communicated ex parte with the
guardians and failed to require guardians to provide accountings of the
estate, that the guardians and Jones’s siblings bargained for certain
estate property, that illegal searches were conducted of Jones’s
belongings by the guardians, and that Jones was prevented from
spending time with her father before his death due to false reports
made by the guardians to convince the court to enter a protective order
against her.123
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction based on the RookerFeldman doctrine, which prohibits federal courts other than the
Supreme Court of the United States from hearing an appeal from a

120

465 F.3d 304, 305-06 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 305.
122
Id.
123
Id. At the time of commencement of probate proceedings, Jones’s father
was still alive. Since he was incapable of handing his own affairs, his estate was
already in the control of the probate court. He died while the proceedings were still
ongoing. Id.
121
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decision made by a state court.124 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
disagreed with the district court’s dismissal based on Rooker-Feldman,
since the federal suit was filed before the state court proceedings
regarding the estate of Jones’s father were completed, and matters
were raised that were not included in the state court claim.125 The
Seventh Circuit was instead concerned with a different jurisdictional
issue: whether or not Jones’s claims would be barred from being heard
in federal court by the probate exception.126
In considering whether the probate exception applied to Jones’s
claims, the Seventh Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Marshall as clarifying of the scope of its application.127 As stated by
the Supreme Court, and reiterated by the Seventh Circuit, the probate
exception “‘precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of
property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it does not
bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and
otherwise within federal jurisdiction.’”128 The court recognized,
however, that this standard is not without its ambiguities. While the
exception’s applicability in diversity cases is well-established,129 the
Seventh Circuit pointed out that “courts are divided over its
applicability to federal-question cases, such as [Jones].”130 Joining the
Ninth Circuit, and disagreeing with the Eleventh, the Seventh Circuit
held the exception applicable to federal question cases.131
124

Id. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is so-named for the two cases which
articulated the concept: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
125
Marshall, 465 F.3d at 305. Matters raised in the federal suit that weren’t
included in the state suit included the alleged bargaining between the guardians and
the siblings and the denial of access between Jones and her father. Jones v. Brennan,
465 F.3d 304, 305 (7th Cir. 2006);
126
Marshall, 465 F.3d at 306.
127
Id.
128
Id. (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 1748 (2006)).
129
See sources cited supra note 4.
130
Jones, 465 F.3d at 306.
131
Id. The cases cited by the Seventh Circuit in its discussion of the circuit
split are In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2004) (probate exception
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The Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion as a matter of
statutory interpretation.132 After engaging in a brief discussion of the
history of the probate exception,133 the court looked to the evolution of
the jurisdictional statutes to support its conclusion that the probate
exception is indeed applicable to federal question cases.134 It reasoned
that because Congress did not significantly alter the language of the
statutes granting jurisdiction to the federal courts after the probate
exception had become established, the intention was that it would
apply to federal-question as well as diversity cases.135 Furthermore, it
found the two primary policy justifications behind the exception to be
equally applicable in both types of cases: first, since the actions
involve a res under the control of a state court, another court should
not be able to interfere; and second, the state courts are believed to be
more proficient at handling probate-related matters.136 Finally, the
court did not see a problem with applying the exception to federal
question cases, concluding that “since state courts are authorized to
decide issues of federal law unless Congress decrees otherwise,
confining a class of federal-law cases to state courts does not deprive
litigants of their federal rights.”137
The court next considered each of Jones’s claims to determine if
they were barred by the probate exception.138 With regard to the claim
of “maladministration of her father’s estate,” the court expressed the
belief that the probate exception clearly applied because the plaintiff
was essentially “asking the district court to take over the

applies to federal question cases) and Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th
Cir. 1988) (probate exception only applies to diversity cases). See supra Part II.B.2
for a more detailed discussion of these cases.
132
Jones, 465 F.3d at 306-07.
133
See supra Part I.A for a more detailed discussion of the historical origins of
the probate exception.
134
Jones, 465 F.3d at 307.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 307-08.
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administration of the estate.”139 However, the application of the
probate exception was not as clear with respect to some of the other
claims, such as the alleged deprivation by the court officials and
guardians of the plaintiff’s property interest in her father’s estate
without due process.140 The court concluded: “Though we are dubious
that any of the plaintiff’s federal claims are outside the probate
exception, the matter is not so clear that the judgment dismissing the
case on jurisdictional grounds can be sustained without further probing
in the district court.”141
B. Issues with the Seventh Circuit’s Application
of the Probate Exception
In its approach to the application of the probate exception in
Jones, the Seventh Circuit displayed some inconsistencies with its own
precedent as well as that of the Supreme Court. First, in Dragan the
court pointed out that the historical basis for interpreting the scope of
the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction was severely flawed.142 But
in Jones, it cited that very same historically-based interpretation of the
statutory language as the reason the probate exception should apply to
federal question cases.143 Second, though the Seventh Circuit has
developed a test to determine the applicability of the probate
exception,144 it did not appear to implicate that test at all in its
discussion of the plaintiff’s claims. And finally, the court seems to be
expanding the parameters of the probate exception in spite of attempts
by the Supreme Court to limit its applicability. Taken together, the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Markham and Marshall indicate a trend
towards narrowing the application of the probate exception,

139

Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
141
Id.
142
See supra Part I.A.1, specifically note 21 and accompanying text.
143
See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
144
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
140
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particularly when there is an issue of federal law involved.145 In earlier
cases, the Seventh Circuit itself also advocated for a narrow
interpretation.146 Yet in Jones, the court took a contrary approach and
adopted an expanded view of the exception, holding it applicable to
federal question cases without any further qualification or guidance to
the lower courts as to application of this rule moving forward.147
Such an extension of the exception is arguably unnecessary, since
the concerns about avoiding interference with state law are not nearly
as compelling in a federal question case as they are in cases premised
on diversity.148 A litigant should have the opportunity to have a
legitimate federal question heard by a federal court, regardless of
whether that federal issue implicates probate matters. The Seventh
Circuit should therefore adopt an approach to the application of the
probate exception that weighs the federal interest more strongly
against the state interest when a federal question is involved. First, the
court should interpret narrowly the types of claims that even trigger
the probate exception analysis, limiting it to “pure probate” matters
such as probating a will and administering an estate or those that seek
control over property that is already in possession of a state court. If
the exception is in fact implicated, then the next step would be an
abstention-type analysis.149 This would give precedent to the federal
interest while still taking into account any compelling interest the state
may have in litigating the matter.

145

See supra Parts II.A and III.B
The court stated that it “had cautioned that the probate exception, as a
judicially created exception to the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction, should be
construed narrowly.” Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1988); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d
471, 475 (7th Cir. 1979).
147
465 F.3d at 306.
148
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
149
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
146
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CONCLUSION
Despite being a source of great confusion, federal courts seem
reluctant to abandon the probate exception. The Supreme Court,
through its decisions in Markham and Marshall, appears to be taking
steps to narrow the application of the exception, particularly when
there is an issue of federal law involved. The Seventh Circuit in Jones,
however, disregarded this narrowing trend by holding that the
exception applies to federal question cases. The court instead should
have adopted an approach that limits the application of the exception
in the specific context of federal question cases. Such an approach
would be consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent, as well as
the policy concerns underlying federal question jurisdiction.
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